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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE 
ORDER OF ELKS, NO. 85, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION and EARL M. 
BAKER, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ASSESSOR, 
and 
TAX COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
TAX COMMISSION 
STATEMENT OF THE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an original action to review certain pro-
ceedings, decisions, and orders of the Utah State Tax 
Commission wherein certain properties in Salt Lake 
County were not exempted from ad valorem property 
taxes by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
for the year 1973. 
Case No. 
13826 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, seeks 
affirmation of its decision upholding the decision of 
the County Board of Equalization which found that 
petitioner's Elks Lodge is not being used exclusively 
for charitable purposes as that term is defined by 
Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution, and Utah 
Code Annotated, Sections 59-2-1, 59-2-30, and 59-2-
31, and that the same is subject to property taxes for 
the calendar year 1973. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner, Benevolent and Protective Order of 
Elks, No. 85, (herein referred to as Elks Lodge), 
has failed to state a substantial number of facts 
material to respondent's case, and which formed the 
basis for respondent, Utah State Tax Commission's, 
decision finding the property subject to property 
taxes. 
References to the transcript of proceedings be-
fore the Tax Commission are designated (A) with 
the page number following, since the transcript is 
designated Exhibit A in the Record on Appeal. Ref-
erences to the remainder of the Record on Appeal 
are designated (R) with the page number following. 
References to petitioner's Brief are designated (PB) 
with the page number following. 
It was the determination of the Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization that petitioner's prop-
erty did not qualify under Utah law for exemption 
from property taxes, since the actual use of the 
2 
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premises was not exclusively for religious worship 
or charitable purposes, regardless of the use of the 
income derived therefrom. The county concluded: 
"That the overall primary use of the 
property is to produce rental and other income 
for the fraternal and social benefit of the 
Lodge, its members and their families, and 
any charitable use is incidental to the primary 
use by the Lodge, its members and their fam-
ilies . . . " 
"Hence, the property is not used exclu-
sively for charitable purposes within the 
meaning of the Utah law." (R-40) 
Petitioner performs patriotic, charitable, and 
civic functions, including: Boys' and Girls' Clubs 
(A-13); local sports programs for children (A-14); 
veterans' services programs (A-22); boy-scout 
troops (A-92, 93), all of which functions are chari-
table activities within the State of Utah, but, signifi-
cantly, said charitable activities were not actually 
conducted on the premises in question. Said chari-
table functions are held at locations and buildings 
elsewhere within the State of Utah. The majority of 
of charitable functions performed by petitioner are 
through cash donations of members, plus a multitude 
of man-hours contributed outside of the premises in 
question. (A-29) Petitioner makes no contention 
that its property is used for religious purposes. (A-
119) 
Petitioner's premises are used in part for the 
sale of liquor and cigars. (A-67, 68) The proceeds 
of said liquor and cigar sales go toward paying for 
3 
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services and, thereafter, into a general fund to be 
used for the different programs of the Elks Lodge. 
(A-68) The petitioner holds lodge meetings once a 
week, each week throughout the year, except for six 
weeks in the summer and provides other major social 
functions of a large variety, including, but not lim-
ited to, Friday night dancing to live music and var-
ious and sundry formal dances. (A-73, 74) Said 
areas designated for social functions, such as danc-
ing, include some sixteen booths, tables for about 100 
people, a dance floor and band area and bar, inas-
much as petitioner has a mini-bottle license and is 
also a Utah State liquor store. (A-76) 
A substantial number of nonmembers enters 
into petitioner's facility (A-118) primarily for din-
ner, drink, recreational or other social functions. 
(A-121) A member is defined as a husband and 
wife, at least one of whom has been initiated a mem-
ber and is paying dues, and a nonmember is everyone 
else. (A-117) 
Petitioner's premises include a building and a 
parking lot. The building has six floors. (A-77) Half 
of the basement floor is a lounge, and the other half 
is taken up by mechanical systems of the lodge, 
including a heating unit, air-conditioning, change 
lockers, etc. (A-77) On the basement floor is a small 
"members only" lounge with pool tables and a bar. 
(A-77-78) The first floor above the basement con-
tains a large lobby area, office space, dining room, 
"antler room, kitchen and rest rooms." (A-78) The 
second floor above the basement contains a ladies' 
lounge, a storage area, a lobby, the lodge room for 
4 
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regular lodge meetings, and a small officers' meeting 
room. (A-83) The third floor from the basement is 
designated the "goodwill room" and is used 75 per-
cent to store and process clothing which is ultimately 
donated to indigents. (A-88) The remaining 25 per-
cent of the third floor is used for storage of petition-
er's property, (A-88) The fourth floor from the 
basement contains one committee room, and the bal-
ance is used for storage of petitioner's property. 
(A-88) The fifth floor is used 100 percent for stor-
age of petitioner's property. (A-88, 89) 
A few charity-related activities: One handi-
capped children's Christmas party, a fund-raising 
drive, a boxing show, and a youth scholarship award 
banquet, are actually held on petitioner's premises. 
(A-102) 
The only financial report before the Utah State 
Tax Commission is the audited financial statement 
for the year ended March 31, 1972, prepared by 
Morrison, Rindlisbaker and Gilchrist, CPA's. (R-23 
to 30) Pursuant to said financial statement, petition-
er's lodge received $38,991.77 in cash solely for char-
itable purposes (R. 23 to 30) but only expended the 
sum of $29,470.65 for charitable purposes. (R.28) 
(See also A-99) This $10,000 surplus received for 
charity is allegedly to operate certain programs inci-
dental to charity and advertising through bulletins 
and posters in support of charity programs. (A-99, 
100) Revenues, pursuant to said financial statement, 
equal $117,202.95, and other revenues from sales at 
$183,000, totaling about $300,000 of gross revenue 
each year. (A-98) (R.28, 29) There are additional 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
funds collected for charity not recorded on the finan-
cial statement through a nickel-and-dime charity 
pot. (A-98) Total charity revenues and charity ex-
penditures are each less than ten percent of the total 
revenue taken in by petitioner. (A-99) The balance 
of revenue collected yearly is used for lodge member-
ship functions and other social, recreational and non-
charitable matters. (R-28) 
The procedural matters regarding the hearing 
and subsequent appeal to this court, as set forth in 
petitioner's Brief (PB-4), are substantially correct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
E X E M P T I O N F R O M U T A H ' S AD VALOREM P R O P -
ERTY TAX UNDER ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 2, OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IS BASED 
UPON THE ACTUAL USE OF THE PROPERTY IN QUES-
TION FOR CHARTIBLE PURPOSES, AND, AS SUCH, PETI-
TIONER'S PROPERTY DOES NOT QUALIFY. 
Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitu-
tion, provides: 
"All tangible property in the state, not 
exempt under the laws of the United States, 
or under this constitution, shall be taxed in 
proportion to its value, to be ascertained as 
provided by law. The property of the state, 
counties, cities, towns, school districts, munic-
ipal corporations and public libraries, lots 
with the buildings thereon used exclusively 
for either religious worship or charitable pur-
poses . . . shall be exempt from taxation . . ." 
6 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-30 (1953), 
provides: 
"This section is intended to clarify the 
scope of exemptions for property used exclu-
sively for either religious worship or chari-
table purposes provided for in section 2 of 
Article XIII of the Constitution of the state of 
Utah. This section is not intended to expand 
or limit the scope of such exemptions. Any 
property whose use is dedicated to religious 
worship or charitable purposes including 
property which is incidental to and reasonably 
necessary for the accomplishment of such re-
ligious worship or charitable purposes, in-
tended to benefit an indefinite number of 
persons is exempt from taxation if all of the 
following requirements are met: 
(1) The user is not organized to produce 
a profit from the use of the property. 
(2) No part of any net earnings, from 
the use of the property, inures to the benefit 
of any private shareholder or individual, but 
any net earnings shall be used directly or in-
directly, for the charitable or religious pur-
poses of the organization. 
(3) The property is not used or oper-
ated by the organization or other person so 
as to benefit any officer, trustee, director, 
shareholder, lessor, member, employee, con-
tributor, or any other person through the dis-
tribution of profits, payment of excessive 
charges or compensations. 
(4) Upon the liquidation, dissolution, or 
abandonment of the user no part of any pro-
7 
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ceeds derived from such use will inure to the 
benefit of any private person." 
The leading and controlling case in this matter 
is the 1971 decision by this Court of Friendship Man-
or Corporation v. Tax Commission, 26 Utah 2d 227, 
487 P.2d 1272 (1971), wherein this Court held that 
simply providing a housing facility for elderly per-
sons was not a charitable purpose, and the property 
was not exempt. The central focus of the above case 
was on the actual use of the premises, and the Court 
concluded, as follows: 
"It is the use to which it puts its real 
property, which is the determination of 
whether or not such property is exempt. If the 
charitable organization does not use its real 
property and building thereon exclusively for 
charitable purposes, such property is not 
exempt, notwithstanding^ the fact that the 
owner thereof is a charitable organization." 
(At page 234) (Emphasis added.) 
Respondent suggests that not only is the "actual 
use" to which property is put the test, but the "ac-
tual, dominant and primary use" of the property. 
"Primary" being inferred from Utah Code Anno-
tated, Section 59-2-30 (1953), providing for "inci-
dental and reasonably necessary." The above case 
recognized that an organization may be charitable 
and still be subject to property taxes. The Elks Lodge 
property in question is not "property which is inci-
dental to and reasonably necessary for the accom-
plishment of such charitable purposes." Petitioner's 
property consists of a lot, including a parking area, 
and a building with six floors. There is no question 
8 
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that five of the six floors are used for lodge activities, 
liquor and cigar sales' consumption, and other meet-
ings and social and fraternal activities of the mem-
bers. In terms of total space, the amount of petition-
er's property used for noncharitable activities is not 
incidental to its charitable activities, but, instead, its 
charitable functions and activities on the premises 
are only incidental to its lodge and social functions. 
In terms of total value, the portion of petitioner's 
property used for charity is only "incidental" to the 
value of the whole property. In terms of time utilized 
for charitable purposes, the use of said property is 
only "incidental" to its other uses for social, recre-
ational, and fraternal matters. "Incidental" is de-
fined in Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition 
at page 904, as: "Depending upon or appertaining 
to something else as primary; something necessary, 
appertaining to, or depending upon another which 
is termed the principal; something incidental to the 
main purpose." Petitioner's Elks Lodge property is 
primarily dedicated to the recreational, social, and 
fraternal matters of its dues-paying members. Its 
primary purpose is not charity; hence, the exemp-
tion for property which is incidental to and reason-
ably necessary for the accomplishment of such 
charitable purposes within the meaning of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 59-2-30 (1953), does not 
apply to the Elks Lodge property. 
This distinction between primary and incidental 
is important, especially in this case. Almost all bus-
inesses and most individuals within this State either 
make some charitable and religious contributions or 
9 
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permit an occasional use of some of their property 
for charitable or religious purposes, yet relatively 
few individuals and businesses have applied for any 
exemption on any portion of their premises. If it 
were to become necessary to review property when 
such contributions or "incidental" use of property 
were made, it would become a horrendous adminis-
trative responsibility to attempt to determine how 
much of each parcel of property was used for what 
proportion of time for religious or charitable pur-
poses. 
In this case, the Elks Lodge argues that because 
approximately ten percent of its expenditures are 
for charitable purposes and because nearly one-sixth 
of the building is used primarily for charitable pur-
poses, the whole building and parking lot should be 
tax exempt; or, in the alternative, that the portion of 
the building which is used only for charitable activ-
ities should be exempt. However, this argument 
totally ignores the fact that the "primary" use of 
the building is for social, recreational and fraternal 
purposes, and the charitable activities are only inci-
dental to those social, recreational and fraternal 
activities. Therefore, it is submitted that any char-
itable use of the building is only incidental to the 
primary use for social, recreational and fraternal 
purposes, and that such incidental charitable use of 
the building does not qualify under the statutory and 
constitutional terms as "used exclusively for reli-
gious worship or charitable purposes" and does not 
qualify for exemption. 
10 
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In Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961 
(1901), the Court stated: 
"The general rule is that all property of 
what kind soever, and by whomsoever owned 
is subject to taxation; and when any kind of 
property is exempt, it constitutes an exception 
to this rule. The reason of the rule is that it 
is just and equitable that every species of 
property within the state should bear its equal 
proportion of the burdens of the government. 
When, therefore, an owner claims that certain 
property is exempt from taxation, the burden 
is upon him to show that it falls within the 
exception. An exemption will not be aided by 
judicial interpretation. It must be shown to 
exist by express terms of the enactment which 
it is claimed grants it. 'The presumption is 
that all exemptions intended to be granted 
were granted in express terms. In such cases 
the rule of strict construction applies, and, in 
order to relieve any species of property from 
its due and just proportion of the burdens of 
the government, the language relied on as cre-
. ating the exemption should be so clear as not 
to admit of reasonable controvery about its 
meaning; for all doubts must be resolved 
against the exemption. The power to tax rests 
upon necessity, and is essential to the exist-
ence of the state. '" 
Decisions of other states regarding similar Elks 
Lodge property are relevant. In Indianapolis Elks 
Building Corporation v. State Board of Tax Com-
missioners, 145 Ind. 522, 251 N.E. 2d 673 (1969), 
the Court held that the Elks Lodge real property 
owned for the benefit of a fraternal organization was 
not entitled to a tax exemption as charitable where 
11 
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the inescapable conclusion was that the dominant 
and primary use of the property was social. The 
Court, in applying a "dominant use of the property" 
test under its statute exempting property used ex-
clusively for charitable purposes, stated the follow-
ing: 
"Our definition [of 'charity'] is consti-
tutionally liberal, while appellant's definition 
renders virtually every act of man and incor-
poration a tax-exempt charitable act. A thor-
ough explanation is obviously necessary. The 
Supreme Court decision in the case of City 
of Indianapolis v. Grand Master of the Grand 
Lodge of Indiana (1865), 25 Ind. 518, sup-
plies the lasting but nebulous constitutional 
definition of the charity. The Court's eloquent 
statement is found on page 522. 
" '. . . It is not essential to charity that it 
must be universal. That an institution limits 
the dispensation of its blessings to one sex, 
or to the inhabitants of a particular city or 
district, or to the membership of a particular 
religious or secular organization, does not, we 
think, deprive it either in legal or popular 
apprehension of the character of a charitable 
institution. If that only be charity which re-
lieves human want, without discriminating 
amongst those who need relief, then indeed it 
it a rarer virtue than has been supposed. . . . 
The appellant's facilities and activities un-
doubtedly suppress human want and suffering 
in addition to promoting brotherly love, jus-
tice, fidelity, etc. But these noble objectives 
can also be seen in the family home and at 
various other public and private establish-
ments, all of which are not exempt from 
12 
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property tax. . . . The inescapable conclusion 
is that the dominant and primary purpose of 
the use of appellant's property is social/ " 
Indianapolis Elks Building Corp. v. State Bd. 
of Tax Commissioners, supra, at page 682. 
In the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks 
Lodge, No. 4,61 v. New Mexico Property Appraisal 
Department, 83 N.M. 445, 493 P.2d 411 (1972), the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the Elks 
Lodge property was not entitled to property tax 
exemption where the primary uses of such property 
were not charitable. 
In the case of Salt Lake Lodge, No. 85, B.P.O.E. 
v. Groesbeck, 40 Utah 1, 120 P. 192 (1911), wherein 
the Court considered the exemption of petitioner's 
property in 1911, the Court stated: 
"The general rule is that when private 
property is claimed to be exempt from taxa-
tion the law under which the exemption is 
claimed will be strictly construed. . . . There 
is, however, an exception to this general rule, 
and statutes exempting property used for 
educational and charitable purposes or for 
public worship, under the great weight of 
authority, should receive a broad and more 
liberal construction than those exempting 
property used with a view to gain or profit 
only. The reason for the rule is that the state, 
by exempting property used exclusively for 
one or more of the purposes mentioned, from 
taxation, is presumed to receive benefits from 
the property equivalent at least to the public 
revenue that would otherwise be derived from 
it." (At page 8-9) 
13 
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The above-cited case relies upon a principle that a 
charitable organization relieves the state from some 
burden to care for the downtrodden, which should 
give rise to a reciprocating exemption by the state 
from property taxes. This broad generalization cre-
ates many difficulties and should be rejected for the 
following policy reasons: 
(1) The taxpayer claimant chooses the char-
ities that will receive the benefits. Some 
charitable organizations, such as the Boy 
Scouts of America, are certainly worth-
while charitable organizations; however, 
the State of Utah, and, specifically, Salt 
Lake County, has no legal obligation to 
support the Boy Scouts of America. 
Therefore, the state is not necessarily 
being relieved of any burden at all. The 
state does have an obligation to provide 
an adequate school system for youngsters 
and to provide many other services, in-
cluding police protection, health and safe-
ty maintenance, which obligations must 
be paid for out of property tax revenues. 
(2) Organizations, such as the Salt Lake 
Elks Lodge, could theoretically comply 
with the above principle if it were the 
sole test, by merely contributing an 
amount equal to their property tax liabil-
ity to a tax-exempt charity. From the 
facts given, the Salt Lake Elks Lodge 
had some $300,000 in gross revenues of 
which $29,000 were expended for chari-
table purposes. Therefore, the Salt Lake 
Elks Lodge could have a total gross rev-
enue of $300,000 and only contribute an 
amount equal to their property tax liabil-
14 
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ity and comply with the above test. "The 
power to tax rests upon necessity and is 
essential to the existence of the state." 
Friendship Manor, supra. The erroding 
tax base would result in one less revenue 
source to conduct necessary state affairs 
and necessarily causes increased taxes in 
other areas, such as sales tax, to make 
up the difference. If such organizations 
then did contribute an amount equal to 
their property taxes and gain exemption, 
they would have the benefits of (1), ex-
emption from property taxes and (2), a 
charitable deduction for income taxes, 
which is in juxtaposition to double taxa-
tion, that being of double deduction and, 
ultimately, double benefit to the Elks 
Lodge. 
(3) The above principle requires a specific 
economic or dollar test to be applied to 
the taxpayer claiming an exemption and 
would be extremely difficult to follow and 
administer in other cases not specifically 
decided by the court. 
If the above test regarding the receipt of bene-
fits equivalent to the public revenue derived from the 
taxation is rejected, then what test should apply? It 
it suggested that to be exempt from property tax 
laws, a test as to the "primary, dominant and actual 
use" of the property should apply. Such a test could 
be determined in terms of revenue intake and expen-
diture for charitable purposes; time and space allo-
cation; a dedication to the conduct of charitable 
activities, and an examination of the specific pur-
poses and intent for which the organization seeking 
exemption is organized and actually operated. 
15 
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Under the facts in the present case, the Elks 
Lodge's charitable activities are merely incidental 
to the primary, dominant, and actual use of the 
premises for social activities and fraternal meetings 
in terms of revenue and expenditures, time and space 
allocations and purposes for which organized and 
operated. Exemption from property taxes should be 
denied. 
POINT II 
THE ALLOWANCE OF A PERCENTAGE OR PARTIAL 
EXEMPTION OF ONE BUILDING IS CONTRARY TO LEGIS-
LATIVE INTENT AND IS ADMINISTRATIVELY AN UNDUE 
BURDEN UPON THE GOVERNMENT. 
Petitioner has urged that in all cases cited the 
test applied to determine whether a portion of the 
property was subject to taxation and a portion ex-
empt was whether the property in question was 
leased to another for commercial or business pur-
poses, or whether the organization used it for gen-
eral business purposes. Petitioner then suggests that: 
(1) It is a charitable organization not organized 
for profit and, therefore, (2) since it, in fact, leases 
no portion of said premises for business purposes, it 
should be exempt. (PB-15) 
Reference is made to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 16-6-22 (1953), which statutorily authorizes 
every nonprofit corporation to purchase, take, re-
ceive, lease, take by gift, or otherwise acquire, own, 
hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and with 
real or personal property, or any interest therein, 
wherever situated. A nonprofit corporation may also 
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sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, trans-
fer and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its 
property and assets (Utah Code Annotated, Section 
16-6-22 (4) (5), (1953). The designation "non-
profit" or "not organized for pecuniary gain" is a 
legal definition and means a corporation, no part 
of the net earnings of which are distributable to its 
members, trustees or officers (Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 16-6-19 (3) (1953). Therefore, under Utah 
law, any nonprofit corporation may, in fact, lease 
property, derive a profit therefrom and still not 
jeopardize its character as a nonprofit corporation, 
or jeopardize its exemption from state franchise 
taxes, unless said activities become dominant, pri-
mary activities for profit. (See Utah Code Anno-
tated, Section 59-13-4 (1953). 
The partial allocation of property taxes appar-
ently first found acceptance in Parker v. Quinn, 23 
U. 332, 64 P. 961 (1901), cited supra, when a por-
tion of a relief society building rented for commer-
cial purposes was subject to tax and a portion not 
so rented was exempt. Since that time, the Utah Leg-
islature recognized that many property tax matters 
are, in fact, not totally 100 percent charitably qual-
ified, and many are not totally 100 percent disqual-
ified as charities. Many properties have some 
incidents of charity exemption and some incidents of 
taxation. By adoption of Utah Code Annotated, Sec-
tion 59-2-30, the Legislature specified that some 
"incidental" and "reasonably necessary" property 
would not defeat a total exemption. Likewise, any 
charitable use of property which is "incidental" to 
a primary use for noncharitable purposes should 
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not give rise to a partial exemption but should be 
totally subject to tax. 
It is also a well-established principle that all 
exemptions from taxation intended to be granted 
were granted in express terms (Parker v. Quinn, 
supra). The statute does not grant a partial exemp-
tion. Exemptions should be strictly construed against 
one seeking exemption (Parker v. Quinn, supra). 
Cases cited by petitioner regarding a partial 
exemption from property taxes are distinguishable 
from Utah law. In Simpson v. Bohon, 159 Fla. 281, 
31 So. 2d 406 (1947), (cited at PB 13), wherein the 
Court held that 43 percent of an Elks Club Lodge 
rented out for commercial purposes was subject to 
taxation and the remainder exempt, the Court relied 
upon a statute not found in Utah law. The Court 
stated: 
"For the exemption to hold under the 
statute, the proceeds from the rented portion 
must also be used for someone of the named 
purposes. This part of the statute, Section 
192.06 FFA, reads: 
"'(3) . . . . and the rents, issues and 
profits of said property are used for the edu-
cational, literary, benevolent, fraternal or 
charitable purposes of said institution.' We 
do not find it so here." (At pages 407, 408) 
The Court also referred to Florida statutes, Section 
192.06 FFA, as specifically exempting benevolent 
and fraternal institutions from taxation. (At page 
407) Under Utah law, there is no statute regarding 
the exemption of property from ad valorem property 
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taxes when the income derived therefrom is utilized 
for charitable purposes. The sole test in Utah is "use 
of the property." Also, the Florida statute expressly 
provided an exemption for property used for bene-
volent and fraternal purposes, whereas the Utah 
statutes and Constitution do not permit any similar 
exemptions. 
In the case of Oklahoma County v. Queen City 
Lodge No. 197, I.I.O.F., 195 Okla. 131, 156 P.2d 
340 (1945) (cited PB-14), the Court stated that 
Oklahoma's Constitution provided an exemption 
from property tax for "benevolent institutions de-
voted solely to the appropriate objects of these insti-
tutions, not exceeding ten acres in extent, and not 
leased or otherwise used with a view to pecuniary 
profit." (At page 347) The Oklahoma Court noted in 
passing that apparently the lodge purchased the 
building in question and, at such time, agreed to an 
arrangement whereby the management and renting 
of the first eleven floors were to be handled, in effect, 
by a representative of the mortgage creditors; and 
so it was argued that in truth and in fact, the lodge 
has not assumed the act of possession of management 
or control of the first eleven floors of the building. 
(At page 345) The Court held the twelfth floor ex-
empt from taxation. The Oklahoma Court, in quoting 
from Volume II, Cooley on Taxation, 4th Ed., page 
1442, Section 688, noted: 
"On the other hand, the better rule seems 
to be that if the exempt and nonexempt parts 
are separable, for purposes of valuation, the 
former should be held not taxable and the 
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latter taxable." (At page 349) (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the present case, the petitioner has testified that 
approximately "75 percent of the floor known as the 
"goodwill room" (A-88) is actually used for chari-
table purposes. Under the Oklahoma case cited by 
petitioner, the Elks Lodge's goodwill room would 
not be entitled to tax exemption, since it is not a 
separable part. 
Partial or percentage exemptions also create 
administrative difficulties. Are the halls and stair-
ways leading to the exempt floor exempt on a portion 
of their use? Is a portion of the parking lot exempt? 
Are offices utilized for preparation of check receipts 
and disbursements pertaining to the charitable-
exempt floor subject to a partial exemption also? 
Should exemption be for actual square foot usage 
as a ratio to the total property, including all contig-
uous land and other buildings on the same lot? The 
Elks Lodge seeks exemption for 75 percent of one 
floor of a six-floor building, which is one building 
on a multi-building property with parking spaces. 
Petitioner's total property is in a highly developed 
area of Salt Lake and includes a parking lot and 
another building leased commercially. Such percen-
tage allocations are arbitrary and necessarily dis-
criminatory to other taxpayers in the manner in 
which the exemption is ultimately granted. From 
here, how do you differentiate industries that 
contribute to charities or allow limited charitable 
activities on their premises; i.e., "sub-for-Santa" 
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collection and preparation? What percentage char-
itable deduction should be allowed? 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court 
should not allow any exemption unless the tests of 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-30, are met in 
terms of "primary use" of property for total exemp-
tion. Petitioner's request for a partial exemption 
should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that the State 
Tax Commission in affirming the decision of the 
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization finding on 
the facts as applied to Utah law, was correct, and 
that the property known as the Elks Lodge was not 
used exclusively for charitable purposes and, hence, 
was subject to the ad valorem property taxes within 
the State of Utah for 1973. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
G. BLAINE DAVIS 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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